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II.. A. No. 21160. 111 Bank. Oct. 1], 1951.] 
FELIX J. WElL, Respondent, v. ~ELEN K. WElL, 
Appellant. 
[la,lbJ Divorce-Trial-Remarks and Conduct of Judge.-In 
husband's action for divorce wherein wife filed cross-com-
plaint for separate maintenanee, statement of trial judge that 
he did not believe in separate maintenance for short mar-
riages does not evidence an unwillingness to try wife's case 
according to law, where the affidavits of counsel for both 
parties indicate that he had an open mind on this issue. 
[2J Judges-Powers and Duties.-A judge is not required to ap-
prove every statute or precedent by which his decision is 
governed; he is bound, not to believe in a particular law, but 
to obey it. 
[3J Id.-Disqualification.-A judge who disagrees with the policy 
of a statute is not necessarily disqualified fro;n hearing a 
case in which that statute must be applied. 
[4J Trial-Remarks and Conduct of Judge.-A judge is not guilty 
of misconduct in expressing to the parties what he believes 
the law should be. 
[6J Id.-Remarks and Conduct of Judge.-A judge may properly 
indicate to litigants the hardship that may result from a 
rigid insistence on technical rights, and such suggestions are 
peculiarly appropriate in a court of equity, especially when 
the task before the court involves the difficult social and legal 
adjustments which attend an unsuccessful marriage. 
[6J Divorce-Trial-Remarks and Conduct of Judge.-Where 
wife's cross-complaint for separate maintenance filed in her 
husband's action for divorce is not based on conscientious 
or religious objections to divorce, it is not error for the 
judge to urge divorce as the more appropriate.solution to their 
problems. 
17J Id.-Public Policy.-Public policy does not discourage divorce 
where the relations of husband and wife are such that the 
legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed. 
[2] See 14 CaI.Jur. 799; 30 Am.Jur. 744. 
[4] See 24 CaI.Jur. 734; 53 Am.Jur. 75. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,6,8,9,11,12] Divorce, § 81 i [2] Judges, 
§21; [3J Judges, §32; [4,5] Trial, §25; [7] Divorce, §5i 
[10] Appeal and Error, §971; [13,15,16] Husband and Wife, 
§ 170; (14) Husbancl and Wife, § 169; [17] Divorce, § 219; 
[18, 19J Divorc~, § 195(3); [20] Divorce, § 184; [21] Divorce, § 183. 
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[8] Id.-Trial-Remarks and Conduct of Judge.-A verment in 
affidavit of husband's attorney, filed in opposition to wif .. 'll 
claim that trial judge was guilty ofmis('onduet in CO('n'rng 
her into amending her cross-complaint fOT separate 1ll.IID-
tenance and consenting to a divorce judgment, that the judge 
told counsel that l:e had decided OD the evidence whieh he hnd 
heard thus far that the husband was entitled to a divorce. but 
that he hesitated to give the husband a divorce becaus'e he 
wanted to award the wife alimony for a reasonable time, is 
relevant on the issue of coercion. 
(9] Id.-Trial-Remarks and Oonduct of Judge.-Mere fact that 
trial judge's suggestion that wife amend her cross-eomplaint 
for separate maintenance to ask for a divorce and consent to 
a divorce jUdgment induced ner to do so does not support a 
claim of coercion, and such suggestion, when considered in 
connection with his statement to counsel that on the evidence 
the husband was entitled to a divorce, would constitute preju-
dicial misconduct only if his announced intention to grant the 
husband a divorce were contrary to the facts of the case as 
he had decided them. 
[10] Appeal-Review-Findings.-The rule that an appellate court 
will not go behind the findings of fact in an effort to determine 
the trial court's true views on the evidence has no application 
to a situation where the findings were entered solely to support 
what was in effect a consent judgment. 
[11] Divorce-Trial-Remarks and Conduct of .Tudge.-Remarks 
of trial judge to counsel during husband's divorce action that 
there was "enough evidence to justify him in granting a divorce 
to either party" wa;; a fair comment on the evidence, where 
they were made for the purpose of assisting the wife in making 
a decision on the judge's suggestion that she :-.mend her cross-
complaint for separate maintenance to ask' for a divorce. 
[12] Id.-Trial-Remarks and Oonduct of Judge.-Statement of 
judge to counsel in a divorce case that "it was clear to him 
from all the evidence that he had heard and read in the case, 
that the legitimate objects of matrimony had been destroyed" 
is supported by evidence that the marriage of the parties 
began with mutual affection and happiness, but that argu· 
ments and misunderstandings, largely over financial matters, 
became increasingly frequent and acrimonious; that the pbysi-
cal health of botb parties had becmne seriously impaired; that 
family, social and bllsiness relationships had been disrupted; 
and that there were no prospects of reconciliation. 
[13] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Undue Inftuence. 
-Evidence supports trial court's eonclusion that 8 de~d 
executed by wife granting to husband her interest in the 
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family home was not o~tained through his undue influence, 
where the house was purchased with his separate funds, but 
title was taken in tht' nRmes of both spouses as joint tenants; 
where she offered, 011 ing him after their first separation, 
to deed her interest ill .utl home to him; and where, after he 
mailed the deed to her, she executed it without again consulting 
with him. 
[14] Id.-TransactioDS Inter Se-Undue In1luence.-When a hus-
band secures a property advantage from his wife, the burden 
is cast on him to show that there has been no undue influence. 
[16] Id.-TransactioDS Inter Se-Undue In1luence.-Whether or 
not a husband gaining a property advantage from his wife 
has overcome the presumption of undue influence is a question 
for the trier of fact, whose decision will not be reversed on 
appeal if supported by substantial evidence. 
[16] Id.- Transactions Inter Se - Undue In1luence.- Evidence 
which might support conclusion that deed of wife's interest in 
home held by spouses as joint tenants was exacted by husband 
as a condition to reconciliation, such as that during t'pe period 
when such deed was executed the parties extensively' discussed 
their separation and husband agreed to reconsider his decision 
to seek a divorce, does not compel conclusion that he im-
properly refused a reconciliation, where there is other evidence 
that the wife had been to blame for the marital discord; that 
she had admitted her fault, desired at least a temporary 
separation, and offered on her own initiative to execute the 
deed; that the husband had paid for the house, and the parties 
had always regarded it as his; and that he made it clear that 
his consent to reconciliation would depend solely on whether 
or not he should ulti:.lately feel, after a period of rest and 
meditation, that a harmonious life with her was possible. 
[17] Divorce-Disposition of Property.-Trial court's award of 
house to husband in a divorce case is not inconsistent with an 
award of the furs and jewelry to wife where there is evidence 
that, although the house was in joint tenancy, it was regarded 
as the husband's property, whereas the furs and jewels were 
given to the wife for her use and usually on special occasions, 
such as wedding anniversaries. 
[18] Id.-Ooosel Fees.-The right to counsel fees on appeal in • 
divorce case is not dependent on proof that the judgment is 
erroneous, and hence affirmance of the judgment does not 
necessarily require an affirmance of the orders denying such 
fees. 
[19] Id.-Ooosel Fees.-Wife's consent to a divorce judgment does 
not bar her right to seek attorney fees on appeal, where the 
principal issue on appeal is whether or not that consent was 
coerced. 
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[20] Id.-Oounsel Fees.-The question of counsel fees in a divorce 
case is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
[21] Id.-Counsel Fees.-In determining the amounts that should 
be awarded for services of wife's cOUDsel where she has ap-
pealed from a divorce judgment after her .:.otion for new 
trial was denied, the trial court should take into consideration 
the fact that the preparation for appeal necessarily duplicated 
much of the preparation for the new trial motion and was 
performed by the same attorneys. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from orders denying attorneys' fees for 
new trial and on appeal. LeRoy Dawson- and William S. 
Baird, Judges. Judgment affirmed; orders reversed. 
Action for divorce, to which defendant filed a cross-com-
plaint for separate maintenance. Judgment granting de-
fendant a divorce on an amended cross-complaint, affirmed. 
Norman Newmark, George I. Devor and Francis C. Whelan 
for Appellant. 
Pacht, Warne, Ross & Bernhard, Isaac Pacht, Clore Warne, 
Rudolph Pac~t, Shirley Adelson Siegel and Maxwell E. 
Greenberg for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, Felix J. Weil, brought this action 
for divorce against defendant, Helen K. Weil, alleging ex-
treme cruelty. Defendant answered, denying cruelty, and 
cross-complained for separate maintenance, alleging desertion 
and 43 specific acts of cruelty. By stipulation the allegations 
of the cross-complaint were deemed denied. At the conclusion 
of the trial defendant amended her cross-complaint to pray for 
a divorce. It was agreed that all findings might be waived, 
except the finding that plaintiff was guilty of one of the specific 
charges of cruelty. A divorce was granted to defendant, she 
was awarded 30 months alimony at $300 a month, certain 
contested furs and jewels were decreed to be her separate 
property, and plaintiff was ordered to pay specified SUlDS to 
her attorneys. The family home was adjudged to be the 
separate property of plaintift'. Defendant and her then attor-
ney consented to the judgment and agreed to accept it as 
"final. " 
-Judge pro tem., assigned bl Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Shortly after the d<'cree was {'ntered, defendant announced 
her refusal to comply witb its provisions. She discharged her 
attorney, moved for a new trial, and then C'Dgaged her present 
counsel. The motion for new trial was denied. Requests for 
orders requiring plaintiff to pay fees for defendant's counsel 
and costs in connection with the new trial motion and for 
similar fees and costs on appeal were also denied. Defendant 
has appealed from the judgment and from the orders denying 
fees and costs. Plaintiff has not appealed. 
Defendant's principal contention is that the trial judge 
was guilty of misconduct in coercing her into amending her 
prayer and consenting to the judgment. In support of this 
contention she has filed an affidavit describing the circum-
stances under which the alleged coercion took place and has 
also presented an affidavit of her trial attorney, Francis C. 
Whelan. C~unteraffidavits have been filed by plaintiff and 
by his attorneys, Isaac Pacht and Rudolph Pacht. Certain 
statements made by the trial judge on the last dil'y of the trial 
and during the argument on defendant's request for counsel 
fees in connection with the motion for new trial are also 
pertinent. 
The question presented is one of fact. In deciding . this -
question, we have carefully examined not only the foregoing 1 
affidavits but also the entire trial transcript and the numerous, 
exhibits. The judicial conduct claimed to be improper con-
sisted of comments by the judge to counsel at the bench and 
in chambers; of necessity, therefore, we have relied principally , 
upon the affidavits of the attorneys who were present on those 
occasions. We have given less weight to the self-serving state-
ments of defendant's affidavit, not only because she proved 
at the trial to be an unreliable witness, but also because her 
version of the judge's remarks is hearsay and goes beyond 
that of her trial attorney, from whom she obtained her in-
formation. 
The trial lasted 15 days. The transcript discloses that on 
the twelfth day of testimony the trial judge interrupted cross-
examination of defendant to call counsel to the bench. The 
affidavit of Francis C. Whelan, defendant's attorney, recites 
that the judge "stated in substance, among other things, that 
he felt it was needless to prolong the trial and that in the 
event defendant and cross-complainant amended her cross-
complaint to ask for a divorce he, the said Judge, was disposed 
to grant her a divorce and alimony for a short period, but that 
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for short marriages and that unlrs8 thrrc was additional evi-
dence that he budn't heard be diull't consider tbat separate 
maintenance should be granted in this case .... " Plaintiff's 
attorney's version of this conference (the Isaac Pacbt affidayit) 
is that the judgc "stated that in view of the admissions and 
contradictions already elicited under cross-examination, he 
could see no useful purpose being served in my continuing 
the cross-examination with other material which might prove 
embarrassing to Helen K. Weil. ... In the course of the dis-
cussion at the bench, which was of very short duration, the 
Judge stated that on the evidence which he had heard thus 
far, it did not appear to him that this was a case for separate 
maintenance. although his mind had not been made up and 
would bc kept open until all the evidence had been introduced 
and the case submitted to him for decision .... Mr. Whelan 
and I suggested that a recess be taken until tbe following day 
to give counsel an opportunity to discuss a possible settlement 
of the case. Judge Baird agreed to this." 
The statement in the Whelan affidavit that the judge re-
marked that it was "needless to prolong the trial" is not in-
consistent witb Pacbt's statement that tbe judge said he could 
see "no useful purpose" in continuing the cross-examination 
"in view of the admissions mid-contradictions already elicited. " 
Moreover, the record supports Pacht's more specific explana-
tion of the judge's action. Defendant had been examined 
about a day and a balf when counscl were called to the bench. 
In several material matters she had been forced to concede 
misstatements in her earlier testimony.- One of her charges 
of cruelty against plaintiff was that he had offended and 
shocked her by discussing indiscreet conduct of certain per-
sons of his acquaintance, that he bad persisted in associating 
with sucb persons in spite of her disapproval, and that he had 
accused her of being" prudish." On cross-examination, there-
fore, defendant was called upon to explain her own relation-
ship with plaintiff before their marriage and while plaintiff 
was still married to a former wife. The judge's interruption 
·For e:sample, defendant testified that while the parties were living in 
New York, early in their marriage, she had been forced to protest against 
intrusions into their home hy plaintiff's friends and relatives, ano that 
on one such oc~asion, durmg a "typi<~al week," she had complained to 
him that "Ursula [plaintiff's stepdaughter] has used the bouse for ber 
friends for jitterbug parties twiee thi" week, and these are all little things 
but they are difficult for me .... " On cross-examination defendant 
admitted tbat at all times covered by this testimony Ursula bad been in 
Colorado and bad beld no dances in tceir New York home. 
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of the cross-examination immediately followed the introduc-
tion into evidence of a communication from a third party indi-
cating that on a trip to Mexico before their marriage plaintiff 
and defendant had posed as man and wife. Defendant ad-
mitted intimate relations with plaintiff for over a year pre-
ceding plaintiff'. divorce from his former wife, and certain 
letters written by defendant describing this relationship were 
introduced. The judge himself later stated that it was to 
avoid further embarrassment, particularly to defendant, that 
he urged a cessation of such evidence and a settlement of 
the ease. 
[la] The judge's statement that he did not believe in sepa-
rate maintenance for short marriages does not, in our opinion, 
evidence an unwillingness to try defendant's case according 
to law. [2] A judge is not required to approve every statute 
or precedent by which his decision is governed. Like other 
citizens he is bound, not to believe in a particular law, but to 
obey it. Thus, he may doubt the wisdom of particulal" economj~ 
legislation, but it is nevertheless his duty to enforce it in a 
proper case. [3] A judge who disagrees with the policy 
of a statute is not necessarily disqualified from hearing a case 
in _which. that statute.must be applied. [lb] In the present 
ease, there has been no showing that the judge's opposition 
to separate maintenance for short marriages was anything more 
than a personal opinion concerning the wisdom of the legisla~ 
tion involved. According to the Pacht affidavit, the judge 
stated that on this issue "his mind had not been made up and 
would be kept open. " Whelan's affidavit also shows that the 
judge's observation was qualified, for it quotes him as saying 
that he did not believe separate maintenance should be granted 
in this case "unless there was additional evidence that he 
hadn't heard." Had he regarded length of marriage as a 
controlling circumstance, «, additional evidence" would have 
made no difference to him. 
[4] The judge was guilty of no misconduct in thus express-
ing to the parties what he believed the law should be. The 
Legislature itself has not infrequently heeded judicial com-
ment suggesting modification of statutes. [5] A judge may 
properly indicate to litigants the hardship that may result 
from a rigid insistence upon technical rights. Such sugges-
tions are peculiarly appropriate in a court of equity, and all 
the more so when the task before the court involves the difficult 
social and legal adjustments that attend the tragedy of an 
unsuccessful marriage. [6] Defendant had divorced her 
) 
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first husband before she met plaintiff, and she knew that 
plaintiff also had been divorced. Even after this suit was 
begun, settlement negotiations were had between the parties 
predicated upon the assumption that a divorce would be 
granted. It is apparent, therefore, that defendant's prayer 
for separate maintenance was not based upon conscientious 
or religious objections to divorce. In view of this fact, and 
in view of the seriousness and finality of the marital rupture, 
as disclosed by the evidence, it was not error for the judge 
to urge divorce as the more appropriate solution to their 
problems. [7] "[P]ublic policy does not discourage divorce 
where the relations between husband and wife are such that 
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly de-
stroyed." (H~7,l v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417].) 
It is clear from the record that the trial judge was anxious 
to spare the parties the spectacle of further embarrassing 
testimony; that he was tentatively persuaded that defendant's 
charges were exaggerated and her testimony unreliable and 
that plaintiff should be given a divorce; that, owing to defend-
ant's possible need of an early operation, together with plain-
tiff's relatively favorable financial position and the absence 
of community property, he felt the desirability of temporary 
payments b! plaintiff to enable defendant to reestablish her-
self economIcally; that in view of the merits of the respective 
cases as thus far presented, and particularly since this mar-
riage had lasted less than five years, he was unwilling to decree 
separate maintenance .as a means of effecting defendant's 
economic adjustment, for that would have deprived plaintiff 
of a divorce; and that he was willing to grant a divorce nomi-
nally to defendant in order that temporary alimony might be 
provided. There is no indication in either affidavit that he 
had prejudged the facts of the case-these were tentative views 
and expressly subject to modification in the event that later 
evidence should require it. 
At that time defendant declined to amend her prayer, and 
the trial proceeded. At the close of the fourteenth day, after 
all evidence had been presented, another conference was held. 
The Whelan affidavit states that the judge told counsel, in 
chambers, "that there was enough evidence to justify him in 
granting a divorce to either party to this action but that in 
the event defendant and cross-complainallt amended her cross-
complaint to pray for a divorce he would grant her a divorce 
and would make an order providiD!! for payment of alimony 
to defendant and cross-complainant for a period of 30 months 
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at the rate of $300 per month, plus a maximum expense of 
$1,000 for an operation if had by her, and that in the event 
def<>ndant and cross-complainant did not so amend he would 
not grant her separate maintenance but would grant a divorce 
to plaintiff and cross-defendant, in which event defendant and 
cross-complainant could not be given any alimony whatso-
ever." The affidavit further states that on the following day 
Whelan and his client "had a conference outside of the court 
room at which time affiant told said Helen K. Weil that the 
trial Judge had stated that unless she amended her cross-
complaint to pray for a divorce and consented to accept the 
judgment of the trial Judge as final he was going to grant a 
divorce to plaintiff and cross-defendant upon the complaint 
of plaintiff and cross-defendant; that thereupon affiant advised 
the said Helen K. Weil that if she wished to get judgment 
for anything in addition to her furs and jewels she would 
have to amend her cross-complaint to pray for a divorce and 
state in open court that she accepted the judgment of the 
trial .r udge as final; that thereupon the said Helen K. Weil 
stated that if there was no alternative and that if, in order to 
get judgment for anything in addition to her said furs and 
jewels, she would have to so amend and so consent, she would 
do so, and thereupon the said Helen K. Weil authorized affiant 
to amend her cross-complaint accordingly .... " 
The Pacht affidavit states that at this later conference 
"Judge Baird said that if we so desired he was now prepared 
to tell us what conclusions he had come to in the case. 
Mr. Whelan and I invited him to give us his views; thereupon 
the Judge stated that it was clear to him from the evidence 
that he had heard and the reaction which he had received 
from the testimony of all the witnesses and his observation 
of them, that Helen K. Weil, soon after the marriage of the 
parties, had embarked upon a campaign to obtain for herself 
an interest in the trust funds to which Felix J. Weil had 
invasion rights j that her continued pressure and intrigue upon 
Felix J. Weil to accomplish this purpose was the basic cause 
for the differences between them, and that the evidence intro-
duced in behalf of Felix J. Weil was more than ample to 
justify a decree in his favor. However, the Judge said he 
hesitated to give a judgment of divorce to the husband because 
tllis would debar him from awarding Helen K. Weil any ali-
mony and he wanted to provide some support money for her 
for a reasonable period of time. He, therefore, suggested that 
if the defendant and cross-complainant, Helen K. Weil, were 
) 
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so inclined she cORld amend her complaint to pray for a 
divorce, which he would grant her, together with alimony at th~ 
rate of $300.00 per month, for a period of thirty (30) months. 
The Judge also said that in any event he was satisfied from 
the evidence that Helen K. Weil had voluntarily and without 
duress or coercion or any false promises, deeded back her 
interest in the property at 533 Spoleto Drive to Felix J. Weil 
and, therefore, he would find that Felix J. Weil was the sole 
and exclusive owner of the whole interest in that property, 
free of any claims on the part of Helen K. Weil. 
"As to the jewelry and furs, "alued at some $18,000.00, 
given to her by her husband and subsequently returned to 
him, he would find, regardless of whether Helen K. Wei! 
amended her cross-complaint to ask for a divorce or not, that 
these were still Helen K. Wei! 's property and he would order 
them to be returned to her, and would also allow her a maxi-
mum sum of $1000.00 for an operation if one is had by her j 
that he would award Mr. Whelan, attorney's fees in the sum 
of $6000.00, and to Messrs. Jennings & Belcher and Sigurd E. 
Murphy, who had, during the course of the trial (at a hearing 
in Chambers in the presence of Mr. Whelan, Rudolph Pacht 
and myself), made application for an allowance for their 
services, the sum of $1500.00. 
"I pr6tested to Judge Baird that on the evidence in the 
case, our client, Felix J. Weil, was entitled to a judgment of 
divorce. I further protested to Judge Baird that the allow-
ance to Mr. Whelan was excessive for the services rendered 
to him, especially in view of the fact that we had already paid 
$2500 attorney's fees to Mr. Sadicoff and a judgment was 
about to be given against Ft'lix J. Weil for $1500.00 for serv-
ices rendered by Messrs. Jennings & Belcher and Sigurd E. 
Murphy, and that our clit'nt was in effect being penalized for 
Mrs. Wei! 's arbitrary and unjustified discharge of her former 
lawyers. Judge Baird then replied that it was clear to him 
from all the evidence that he had heard and read in the case, 
that the legitimate objects of matrimony had been destroyed 
and that while he recognized the validity of my argument 
that we had proven a case entitling Felix J. Wei! to a divorce, 
he still felt that he wanted to do something for Helen K. Weil 
in the way of support money until she could reconstitute her 
life j as to the attorney's fees of Mr. Whelan, he felt that this 
was a reasonable amount, to which I then replied that I would 
defer to the court's conclusion. I argued, however, that even 
if the Judge insisted upon granting the divorce to Helen K. 
:1. that he hase the ::e ·~::upon the allega::C:.: ./ 
forth in subdivision 2 of Paragraph 11 of the Second Cause 
of Action in the amended cross-complaint and that the court 
find all the other specifications of croel conduct set forth in 
the said amended cross-complaint to be untrue. The Judge 
said he would so find, and Mr. Whelan agreed to have such 
findings made and to waive all other findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the case." 
Once again it is to be observed that the Whelan and Pacht 
affidavits. are not. materially inconsistent. The Whelan affi· 
davit makes no mention of the judge's conclusions on the 
merits of the case-nowhere is there any contradiction of the 
categorical averment by Pacht that the judge stated "it was 
clear to him from the evidence" that defendant's "continued 
pressure and intrigue" in her •• campaign to obtain for herself 
an interest in the trust funds" of plaintiff was the "basic 
cause" of their marital differences, nor is there any contradic-
tion of the further averment that the judge ",;.ecognized the 
validity of my argument that we had proven a case entitling 
Felix J. Weil to a divorce." 
These statements are not only uncontradicted; they find 
strong support in the record. Following the judge's unsuc· . 
cessfuleffort to bring an ~nd to the trial-on -the twelfth llay,~ 
the cross-examination of defendant was continued and addi-
tional misstatements and inconsistencies on her part .wer.e .. 
established. Notable among these were misstatements relating 
to the charge in her verified complaint that plainti1I had 
appropriated approximately $4,000 of her earnings as a school ! 
teacher in New York. Undisputed records of the New York 
Board of Education showed that she had earned only $704.50 
in the period in question. Nor was even this amount appro-
priated. Following her endorsement of the salary checks they 
were deposited in the parties' joint account, on which defend-
ant had the right to draw, and did draw, for whatever she 
needed.· Defendant's theory of "appropriation" was that 
plaintiff insisted that her checks be deposited in their joint 
."Q. You eould draw whatc.er cheeks you wanted to on this joint bank 
account, couldn't you' A. Yes. Q. And you did' A. Yes." In a 
deposition, defendant had earlier testified as follows: ' • Q. And you 
drew on the joint account! A. For housekeeping and-- Q. How 
much did it cost you to li.e during that period a month or per year' 
A. I don't know, but we certainly had ample. Q. How much' A. I 
don't know. Q. Out of tbat account you paill YOUT household bills, your 
clothes' A. We traveled, yes. We lived well. Q. Everything for your 
joint benefit! A. Yes. Q. And in that accoWlt he put his money, too. 
his income f A, Yea." 
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account in spite of her desire to give the money to her mother. 
It was established, however, that defendant had drawn checks 
to her mothE'r's order during the period in question-a fact 
which defendant did not recall until the checks were exhibited 
to her. Moreover, her mother lived with the parties during 
most of their married' life before their separation; at such 
times her expenses were paid by plaintiff, including medical 
expenses, and she was given in addition a monthly allowance 
of $100 by plaintiff, from which she saved approximately $900. 
It is not disputed that there was an affectionate relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant's mother. 
Defendant also charged that plaintiff had forced her to 
decline a permanent appointment as a teacher in New York 
in order that she might devote herself entirely to his interests. 
A letter written by defendant at a later date showed, however, 
that this decision was reacherl jointly by the parties, that the 
appointment was declined so that defendant might devote 
herself not only to her home but also to her art studies, financed 
by plaintiff, and that at that later date defendant had "no 
regrets" about the action that had been taken-"I still think 
this decision was good." 
Defendant also claimed that plaintiff would not permit her 
to have children. A gynecologist testified, however, that the 
parties had consulted him to determine why ddendant had 
not become pregnant and that they had stated they had been 
trying to have children for a year. Office records substan-
tiated his testimony. 
Defendant's principal corroborating witness was her sister, 
Mrs. Mildred Green. In her testimony Mrs. Green unequivo-
cally denied that she had advised defendant concerning evi-
dence that should be produced or allegations that should be 
made or that she had written any letters to defendant in 
which she told her how to conduct the CBSe. Such a letter 
was introduced, however; it was written to defendant shortly 
after plaintiff's complaint was filed and cGntained detailed 
instructions concerning evidence and allegations. Mrs. Green 
admitted that the letter was hers. 
This letter is also noteworthy for its emphasis upon the 
trusts in which plaintiff's assets were held and upon defend-
ant's activities concerning them. Plaintiff and defendant had 
first met through Mrs. Green, who was employed by the insti-
tute that held plaintiff's money, and who was therefore familiar 
with the persons and circumstances connected WitIl the trusts. 
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divorce action and should show: "Husband alienated for very 
obvious reasons, as soon as you prevailed upon Lix [plaintiff] 
to retain control of his money-this provoked H [one of the 
Institute officials and a life-long friend of plaintiff]. . .. 
Your attorney should threaten to expose H .... Your attor-
ney must also prove that you are not a gold-digger, you showed 
this by signing the deed to the house, etc. . . . Lix signed 
control of money to Institute-but Lix is still trustee and it 
still legally belongs to Lix. H. will try to bribe you. . . . 
State motives-why your marriage was interfered with from 
outside-intentional outside interference for very obvious rea-
sons-at the very moment you tried to make Lix see the light. 
H & P [another Institute official and close friend of plain-
tiff's] are living on Lix' money .... It will be a bard fight 
but I think it is worth it. You may even win Lix back-
for he is bound to sit up and take notice when people he has 
known for years testify in your behalf. It would be wonderful 
if you would crush these fiends. I hope this will pr6ve helpful 
to you. I intend to see more people within the next few days 
and will keep you posted." The observations in this letter 
are in marked contrast to defendant's testimony that she did 
not urge plaintiff to withdraw his money and give up his 
friends. Significantly, the witnesses referred to in the letter 
were not called to testify in defendant's behalf. 
In thus reviewing the record, we are not to be understood 
as having substituted our decision on the evidence for that of 
the trier of· fact. [8] The matters we have discussed, how-
ever, are relevant to the question of fact that is presented 
to this court by defendant's appeal, namely, whether or not 
the trial court improperly coerced her. Defendant has sub-
mitted her affidavit to aid as in deciding that question, and 
we have therefore exami'ued the record for indications of her 
credibility. We have also sought to evaluate, on the basis of 
the record, the uncontradicted claim of the Pacht affidavit 
that the judge had decided that defendant's financial intrigue 
was the cause of the marital rupture and that plaintiff was 
entitled to a divorce. 
[9] There can be no doubt that the judge's suggestion 
that defendant amend her cross-complaint induced her to do 
so, but there must be more to a claim of coercion than mere 
causation. If the judge believed from the evidence that plain-
tiff was entitled to a divorce, and if he so stated to counsel, 
then his suggestion was not, as to defendant, improper. The 
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if his announced intention to grant plaintiff a divorce were 
contrary to the facts of the case as he had decided them. 
Defendant has failed before this court to prove that fact. 
We have concluded, therefore, that defendant's amendment 
of her prayer and consent to the judgment were made to 
obtain alimony to which she would not otherwise have been 
entitled, and that sh€ was persuaded to make that decision, 
not because of any prejudice or misconduct of the court, but 
because she had failed to establish her case. 
[10] Defendant relies upon the rule that an appellate court 
will not go behind the findings of fact in an effort to determine 
the trial court's true views on the evidence. Manifestly that 
rule can have no application to a situation where it is clear 
that the findings were entered solely to support what was in 
effect a consent judgment. 
[11] Defendant also points to the statement in the Whelan 
affidavit that the judge remarked that there was "enough 
evidence to justify him in granting a divorce to either party." 
This is a fair comment on the evidence from the standpoint 
of an attack by appeal, for the conflicting testimony of plain-
tiff and defendant made the decision on the facts depenu 
largely upon the credibility of the witnesses. The judge's 
purpose in making this observation appears to have been to 
point out to counsel that if his suggestion were not followed 
and plaintiff were granted a divorce, defendant would prob-
ably be unsuccessful on appeal, but that if, by agr~ement, 
the divorce were given to defendant, it would have every 
appearance of evidentiary support. In our opinion this was 
an accurate description of the legal situation and was rendered 
with a view to assisting defendant in making her decision. 
[12] It is apparent from the proposal made by the trial 
judge, and from his other comments, that he believed a divorce 
was the only satisfactory solution to the problems presented 
in the marital tragedy that confronted him. His statement 
that "it was clear to him from all the evidence that he had 
heard and read in the case, that the legitimate objects of matri-
mony had been destroyed" is conclusively supported by the 
record. The evidence shows that the marriage of the parties 
began with mutual affection and happiness, but that argu-
ments and misunderstandings, largely over financial matters. 
became increasingly frequent and acrimonious. The physical 
health of both parties has become seriously impaired. Family, 
social, and even business rplationships have been disrupted. 
No prospects of reconciliation remain--the final separation 
\ 
) 
784 WElL v. WElL [37 U.2d 
followed earnest efforts to overcome differences and live peace-
fully together. Since the filing of the complaint the activities 
of the parties have degenerated into a legal battle, character-
ized by extravagant and embittering charges, and in which 
the only remaining consideration of importance is money. 
We cannot ignore the important "social considerations which 
make it contrary to public policy to insist on the maintenance 
of a union which has utterly broken down." (Blunt v. Blunt, 
[1943] A.C.517, 525 (H.L.), 169 L.T.R. 33, 34; Hill v. Hill, 
23 Ca1.2d 82, 93 [142 P.2d 417].) 
The authorities cited by defendant are not inconsistent with 
the result here reached. In Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal.2d 153 
[199 P.2d 934], where the wife sought and was granted a 
divorce, part of her case was unquestionably prejudged. The 
trial court announced, before any of the wife's evidence was 
presented, that "anybody can get a job now ... men or 
women" and that he would not consider an award of alimony. 
Her attorney introduced evidence of her physical"'condition 
and living expenses, but the judge several times declared it 
was "a waste of time." Early in the trial, when the husband , 
offered to withdraw his cross-complaint if the wife would 
waive alimony, the judge stated that her waiver would be 
unnecessary because "the Court will waive ithiDiSelf.'·' "The 
husband rested without presenting evidence. This court re-
viewed the wife's case, including the fact that the parties had 
been married many years and that the wife was beyond middle 
age and without experience other than as housewife and 
mother, and it was concluded that the evidence would have 
supported an award of alimony and that the wife was there-
fore prejudiced by the court's refusal to consider her claim. I 
In Del Ruth v. Del Rtdh, 75 Cal.App.2d 638 [171 P.2d 34], 
the trial court refused to consider many of the material allega-
tions made by each party and at the outset limited the proof, 
of cruelty to the two or three years immediately preccding 
separation, although the parties had been married over 20 
years. Also, at one point in the trial, the judge called the 
wife to his chambers and expressed reluctance to grant separate 
maintenance; no attorneys were present at this conference 
and the affidavits regarding the details of what took place 
do not appear in the opinion. The trial court ultimately gave 
a divorce to the husband on the basis of the wife's cruelty 
but nevertheless awarded her three-fourths of the community 
property. In reversing the judgment, the appellate court 
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have allowed his opposition to separate maintenance to color 
his judgment; his remarks regarding separate maintenance 
were referred to solely in connection with the qnestion whether 
or not the wholesale exclusion of issues had been prejudicial 
error. As in the Webber case, there was no suggestion of 
consent to the judgment. 
In Wuest v. Wuest, 53 Cal.App.2d 339 [127 P.2d 934), the 
wife brought an action in equity to modify a property stipUla-
tion that had been made a part of an earlier divorce decree. 
She alleged that she had agreed to the stipulation but that in 
other respects her attorney had exceeded his authority in 
waiving her rights and that she was not advised of the legal 
effect of her consent. She also alleged that she had proved 
a cause of action for divorce on the ground of her husband's 
physical cruelty and that when she agreed to the stipulation, 
she was sick in mind and body as a result of his beatings and 
the court's enforced psychiatric examinations. She further 
alleged that the trial court had threatened to deny the divorce, 
so that she would have been forced to return to her husband, 
unless she consented to the stipulation. For purposes of 
demurrer these allegations were a.~sumed to be true, and the 
appellate court held a cause of action in equity had been 
stated.- TJ1e facts alleged in the Wuest case are markedly 
different from those now before us. Here, defendant's attor-
ney did not exceed his authority. nor had defendant estab-
lished a cause of action entitling her to a divorce. It is true 
that defendant's affidavit alleges that she was "harassed, 
nervous, upset and distraught," but she has pointed to no 
persuasive evidence that she was not mentally qualified to 
make her decision. In the Wuest case the wife's mental con-
dition was recognized as doubtful even during the trial; here 
there appears at most to have been only the nervousness that 
many litigants feel while in court. Moreover. both the trial 
judge and defendant's counsel advised her concerning the 
legal effect of her consent. 
In Rosenfield v. Vosper,45 Cal.App.2d 365 [114 P.2d 29], 
it was held that the trial judge acted improperly in stating 
during settlement discussions that a particular amount ap-
* After a trial, in which it was found that all the wife's allegations 
were true, a judgment modifying the property sgreement was affirmed 
on a second appeal. (72 Cal.App.2d 101 [164 P.2d 32).) The appellate 
court observed that it could not" enthusiastically agree" that th(> eyidcnce 
of fraud preponderated in thp wife's favor, but that there was '·sub· 
atantial" evidence to support the findings. 
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peared reasonable and in urging the defendant to settle at 
that figure. The defendant refused, and the judge later 
decided the case on the basis of a much higher amount. The 
appellate court was impressed by the fact that after the judge's 
comments the plaintiff amended his prayer; the amount ulti-
mately allowed by the judge exceeded what was originally 
asked by the plaintiff. The opinion of the dissenting judge 
shows, furthermore, that even under those circumstances the 
court had difficulty in deciding whether or not the judge had 
acted improperly. 
Each of the cited cases in which trial judges have been 
found guilty of misconduct (see also Pratt v. Pratt, 141 Cal. 
247 [74 P. 742]; Bell v. United States, 9 F.2d 820) has 
differed substantially from the others; none of them can be a 
controlling precedent in a new situation in which new fact 
questions are presented. Differences in the nature of the 
litigation, the particUlar comments or conduct of the trial 
judge, the scope and reliability of affidavits by ",arties and 
attorneys, and the state of the evidence at the trial make it 
essential that each case turn upon its own facts. 
Defendant's second major contention relates to an inde-
pendent claim that a deed executed by her granting to plain-
tiff her interest in the family home in Santa Monica was 
obtained through undue influence. She contends that under 
no theory of the evidence could the trial court decree the 
deed to be valid; if this contention is sound, it was error for 
the judge to advise her, at the time he suggested that she 
amend her prayer, that he had decided to award the house 
to plaintiff. Defendant concedes that if there were conflicting 
evidence on this issue, the court might properly have ruled 
in plaintiff's favor, and she also states that "it may be" that 
on the issue of actual fraud the evidence was in conflict. She 
argues, however, that even the testimony of plaintiff himself 
raises a presumption that the deed was obtained by undue 
influence (see Civ. Code, §§ 158, 2235) and was therefore a 
constructive fraud. 
The house in question was purchased with plaintiff's sepa-
rate funds, but title was taken in the names of plaintiff and 
defendant as joint tenants. According to plaintiff's testimony, 
defendant complained insistently about plaintiff's financial 
affairs and urged him to exercise invasion rights in certain 
trusts into which he and his father had deposited funds. 
Plaintiff was satisfied with these trusts, however, and with 
the research work of the institute for whose benefit they had 
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been pstablished. He therefore refused defendant's demands 
that he transfer severa) hundred thousand dollars to the joint 
bank account of the parties. From time to time quarrels 
occurred regarding these financial matters. There were other 
quarrels over furs and jewelry, and on severa] occasions he 
acceded to her wishes and purchased them for her. 
Plaintiff further testified that defendant eventually sought 
to dispel the impression that she was a "gold-digger." On 
one occasion she proposed to leave him, and on her own initia-
tive she wrote and signed a paper giving back to him the house 
and the furs and jewelry, and waiving any right to support; 
this document was introduced at the trial. Plaintiff refused 
this offer and regarded it as but an incident of a quarrel. 
Later, however, after further arguments on the same subject, 
defendant again offered to deed him the home and on this 
occasion he accepted; but defendant then refused to sign the 
deed. By this time plaintiff was genuinely apprehensive con-
cerning defendant's interest in his finances. 
At this juncture, the parties had their first separation, and 
shortly thereafter plaintiff went to New York to attend a 
meeting of the American Economic Association. Defendant 
followed, and they met at the home of her sister, Mrs. Green. 
A discu~sion of their future ensued, and. as evidence of her 
good faith in financial matters, defendant again proposed to 
deed her interest in the home to plaintiff. Plaintiff mailed 
the deed to her the next day, and she executed it without 
again consulting with him; it was acknowledged before a 
notary and in the presence of Mrs. Green. At the next meet-
ing of the parties, defendant delivered it to plaintiff. Plaintiff 
then returned to California, and it was agreed that he would 
send for her if he should decide that another attempt to live 
together might be successful. According to plaintiff, defendant 
stated that she too desired at least a temporary separation, 
and she admitted that she had been at fault and that plaintiff 
had grounds for divorce. A few weeks later defendant sud-
denly returned to California, declaring that she had cancer. 
Although plaintiff had not yet come to a conclusion r<lgarding 
a reconciliation and was in doubt concerning the genuineness 
of her claim that she had cancer, he admitted her to the house 
and they lived together several additional months before tlleir 
final separation. 
[13] The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that 
the deed was the voluntary and deliberate act of defendant. 
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that plaintiff did not use his position as her husband to obtain 
the conveyance. [14] It is true, as defendant contends, that 
when a husband secures a property advantage from his wife, 
the burden is cast upon him to show that there has been no ' 
undue influence. (Civ. Code, §§ 158,2235; Bryson v. Byre,., 
87 Cal.App. 320, 323 [262 P. 461J ; Combs v. Oombs, 75 Cal. 
App.2d 903, 904 ll71 P.2d 949J; Jorgenson v. Pa,.dee, 101 
Ca1.App.2d 96, 98 [224 P.2d 884J ; see Estate of Oove,., 188 
Ca1. ] 33, 143-144 [204 P. 583].) [15] It is also true, how. 
ever, that whether or not the spouse gaining such an advantage 
has overcome the presumption of undue influence is a question 
for the trier of fact, whose decision will not be reversed on 
appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (Brown v. Oana-
dian Industrial Alcohol Co., 209 Cal. 596, 599 [289 P. 6]3J ; 
Taylor v. TaylO1', 66 Ca1.App.2d 390, 396-397 [152 P.2d 480); 
Oomb.~ v. Comb8, supra, 75 Cal.App.2d 903, 904-905.) 
In only onc of the many cases cited by defendant was the j 
trial court's find ing that there was no undue influeJ1ce re-
versed. (Gaines v. California Trust Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 709 
[121 P .2d 28).) There it was proved that the wife had l~ved 
harmoniously witb her husband for many years, had complete 
trust and confidence in him, and was accustomed to sigIlil!g_ 
whatever legal papers he submitted to her wIthout questioning 
or even reading them. One day he showed her his will and 
tolo her to sign it; when she asked why her signature was --
nE'cessary, he said, "Edith, I am in a hurry. Sign this will." 
Rhf' immediately signed the docm.lent without examining it 
or having it read or explained to her and in ignorance of the 
fact that it contained a waiver of her community property 
rights and an election to take under the will a much smaller 
estate. There was no consideration for this act for her hus-
band had no separate property to which she thereby obtained 
any rights. ShE' was not informed of the effect of her signature 
until after his death, and at all times she was unfamiliar with 
legal and business matters and did not even know that her 
husbano would leave a substantial estate. All of these facts 
WE're affirmatively established at the trial, and most of them 
were incorporatE'd in the trial court's findings. It was held 
that under such circumstallces the presumption of undue 
inflnence had not been overcome. 
Thl' facts in the present case are materially different. De-
fendant was not accustomed to relying on plaintiff's judgment 
in business affairs but was continually seeking to interfere in 
decisions concerning even his separate property. The deed 
) 
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WAS signed and delivered at a time when the parties were 
discussing their separation and a possible divorce, so that 
defendant was aware that her interests and those of her hus-
band were in conflict. She had ample opportunity to obtain 
indE'pendent advice .. and the evidence shows that her sister, 
who admittedly had advistld her about her relations with 
plaintiff and who has since advised her in this lawsuit, was 
with her when the deed was acknowledged (see Brown v. 
Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co., 209 Cal. 596, 599 [289 P. 
613]); the deed was executed during a three-day period in 
which plaintiff did not see defendant. Defendant fully under-
stood the nature and legal effect of the step she was taking, 
and in fact it was she who proposed it. 
[16] Defendant contends that the evidence conclusively 
shows that her deed was improperly exat'ted by plaintiff as a 
condition to reconciliation. There is evidence which, if be-
lieved by the trial court, would support such a conclusion, 
for during the period when defendant executed the deed, the 
parties extensively discussed their separation and plaintiff 
agreed to reconsider his decision to seek a divorce. That evi-
dence does not compel the conclnsion that plaintiff improperly 
refused a reconciliation, however, in view of the fact that 
there was ot~er evidence that defendant had been to blame 
for the marital discord (see Taylor v. Taylor, 66 Cal.App.2d 
390,395,398 [152 P.2d 480] ; Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246. 
253 [34 A.2d 428,432, 149 A.L.R. 1006]), that she admitted 
hcrfault, that she herself desired at least a temporary separa-
tion (ct. Civ. Code, § 159), that she offered on her own initia· 
tive to execute the deed, that plaintiff had paid for the house, 
and that the parties had always regarded it as his. Although 
defendant's apparent contrition and promises of reform, to-
gether with her renunciation of any technical claim to property 
thought of as plaintiff's may well have led to his belief that 
a divorce might be unnecessary, nevertheless he made it clear 
that his consent to reconciliation would depend solely . upon 
whether or not he should ultimately feel, after a period of 
rest and meditation, that a harmonious life with defendant 
was possible. There was ample evidence to justify the con-
i elusion that any pressure on defendant to execute the deed 
was the result of her past conduct and not undue influence 
by plaintiff. Plaintiff did not demand the deed as a condition 
of his rE'consideration; rather defendant voluntarily offered 
it as evidence of the sincei-ity of her promises to reform. 
\ -, 
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[17] Finally, it is urged that the trial court's award of the 
house to plaintiff is inconsistent with the award of the furs 
and jewelry to defendant. Defendant testified that she ex-
ecuted and delivered the deed to the house but did not deliver 
or agree to deliver the furs and jewels. Moreover, plaintiff's 
statement that defendant made a "gift" of the furs and 
jewels was largely a legal conclusion based upon evidentiary 
details relating to donative intent, delivery, and acceptance; 
on the extensive evidence that was introduced on this issue, 
the trial court may well have reached a contrary conclusion. 
The differing circumstances under which plaintiff had origi-
nally made these gifts to defendant were also relevant to the 
claim that plaintiff's later conduct was unconscientious; there 
was evidence that although the house was in joint tenancy 
it was regarded as plaintiff's property, whereas the furs and 
jewels were given to defendant for her use and usually on 
special occasions such as wedding anniversaries. 
In addition to her appeal from the judgment, def~dant 
has appealed from orders denying counsel fees and costs for 
the new trial motion and for appeal. 
It is not disputed that plaintiff is able to pay for the reason-
able value of the services rendered by defendant's present 
attorneys, nor is it denied that· defendant is without funds. 
Plaintiff claims, however, that defendant's attack upon the 
judgment has not been made in good faith. 
[18] It is elementary that the right to counsel fees on ap-
peal is not dependent on proof that the judgment is erroneous. 
(Gay v. Gay, 146 Cal. 237,240 [79 P. 885].) Our affirmance 
of the judgment, therefore, does not necessarily require an 
affirmance of the orders denying such fees. [19] For the 
same reason, defendant's consent to the judgment does not 
bar her right to seek attorney fees, for the principal issue on 
appeal is whether or not that consent was coerced. The essen-
tial question is whether or not defendant prosecuted the appeal 
in the belief, held in good faith, that she had reasonable 
grounds for seeking a reversal. Affidavits of her attorneys 
were submitted stating that they had carefully examined the 
record and the pertinent legal authorities and that they be-
lieved, and therefore had advised defendant, that the appeal 
involved meritorious grounds of contest and offered substan-
tial hope of success. At the hearing on the motion, the sincerity 
of these affidavits was expressly conceded. [20] The ques-
tion of counsel fees is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. (Kellett v. Kellett, 2 Cal.2d 45, 48-50 [39 P.2d 
) 
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203].) ]n rare instane('s, however, an order denying fees will 
be reversed where it is shown that the appeal presents" debat-
able questions which were not without substantial merit or 
controversy." (Norris v. Norris, 50 Cal.App.2d 726, 735 [123 
P.2d 847].) We believe this to be such a case. 
[21] Plaintiff contends that the allowance of $6,000 to de-
fendant's trial attorney included compensation for a motion 
for new trial. The trial court believed, however, that a final 
agreement in the case had been reached and therefore did not 
contemplate that such a motion would be made. In determin-
ing the amounts that should be awarded for services of counsel, 
the trial court will take into consideration the fact that the 
preparation for appeal necessarily duplicated much of the 
preparation for the new trial motion and was performed by 
the same attorneys. 
also affirm all orders from which appeal is taken. 
The judgment is affirmed. The stay of execution is dis-
charged and the petition for supersedeas is dismissed. The 
orders denying counsel fees and costs for the new trial motion 
and for appeal are reversed, and the trial court is directed to 
allow reasonable sums therefor. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. I 
SCHAUER, J., concurring and dissenting.-I concur in the 
affirmance of the judgment but on the entire record would 
\ 
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